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ABSTRACT 
This paper analyses the fundamental reasons of the current global economic crisis in the 
Eurozone and PIIGS – Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece and Spain. It evaluates the tight economic 
integration within the Eurozone, and scrutinises the reasons for PIIGS to be more intensely 
exposed to the economic crisis. It focuses on the structure of the real economy and the financial 
market, and outlines the levels of competitiveness and financialisation across the Eurozone and 
PIIGS. The paper states that the reason of the economic crisis in PIIGS was not only (i) 
unregulated financialisation or over-financialisation, but also (ii) the economic and trade 
imbalance among the Eurozone members, (iii) the falling rates of profit in the real economy, and 
(iv) the failure of real profits to compensate financial profits. 
 
Keywords: competitiveness; economic crisis; Eurozone; financialisation; financial market; 
PIIGS; real economy 
 
Introduction 
The current global economic crisis has been widely scrutinised and published from many 
different scholarly perspectives. Among these, a significant share supported the view that the 
fundamental reason of the economic crisis is the boom in the financial market.1 However, in stark 
contrast to the hegemony of this viewpoint in the academic world, the real world politics have 
rather experienced long discussions on the implementation of recovery policies and labour 
market reforms in the real economy, much earlier and more comprehensive than the regulation 
procedures for financial markets. 
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Based on this dichotomy in the academic world and the real world, this paper aims to 
scrutinise the fundamental reasons of the economic crisis by comparatively analysing the 
structure of the real economy and the financial market in the Eurozone and PIIGS. It outlines the 
theoretical and empirical roots of the interrelation between the real economy and the financial 
market. It scrutinises the rate of profit in the real economy (real profit) and the rate of profit in 
the financial market (fictitious profit), and probes the origins of the imbalance between the two.   
The paper examines the emergence of the current global economic crisis in the United 
States (US) and the reasons for it to be transmitted to other regions of the world. It reveals the 
grounds of the Eurozone economies for being strikingly influenced by the economic crisis. For 
this purpose, it analyses the institutions securing tight economic integration and competitiveness 
within the European Union (EU), and makes an inquiry into the uniqueness of PIIGS.  
The paper compares the scope of the real economy and the financial market in the 
Eurozone and PIIGS, and assesses the growth of capital input and labour input, labour 
productivity, unit labour cost, public debt, current account balance, fiscal balance and financial 
transactions for providing a comprehensive overview of the European market. This broad 
analysis aims to reveal both the economic imbalance (in terms of trade and competitiveness) and 
the gap between the volumes of financial account balances within the Eurozone. In order to 
picture this imbalance within the Eurozone, PIIGS economies are compared with the strongest 
economy within the Eurozone, i.e. Germany, and also with the Euro Area 16/19 where data is 
available. 
Based on this analytical enquiry, it states that the reason of the economic crisis in PIIGS 
was not only (i) unregulated financialisation or over-financialisation, but also (ii) the economic 
and trade imbalance among the Eurozone members, (iii) the falling rates of profit in the real 
economy, and hence, (iv) the failure of real profits to compensate financial profits. 
 
The Real Economy, the Financial Market and the Current Global Economic Crisis 
On its way to overcome the challenges faced in the analysis of the current global economic crisis, 
this paper highlights the importance of scrutinising the relationship between the real economy 
and the financial market.2 To do this, the first vital move is to introduce ‘a more integrated view 
of the relations between financial phenomena and the dynamics of production’, which provides 
the tools for distinguishing the fundamental reasons from the triggering effects3 and reaching 
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some conclusions on the endemic and epidemic nature of economic crises in the capitalist mode 
of production.  
 
The Relation between the Real Economy and the Financial Market 
The capitalist economy is driven by the accumulation of surplus value at an increasing rate. To 
achieve this, there is a perpetual struggle for boosting competitiveness of the economy and 
increasing rate of profit. Relocating production to low-cost markets and intensifying exploitation 
of labour are two main strategies for increasing the competitiveness of the economy. As the 
relocation of production further boosts global competitiveness among markets, the pressure to 
implement more comprehensive mechanisms for increasing the rate of profit also grows. This 
ultimate aim of the capitalist mode of production is reached through labour market reforms, 
which mainly include deregulation and flexibilisation policies for creating an efficient, 
productive and profitable labour regime. Put plainly, labour market reforms are key mechanisms 
in securing the increasing rates of capital accumulation in the real economy.  
However, despite the presence of various mechanisms that aim for “healthy” and “steady” 
functioning of the capitalist economy, history of capitalism proved that the capitalist mode of 
production has been cursed with economic crises. In political economy literature, Turan Subasat 
categorically identifies three approaches to economic crisis: structural, conjunctural and policy-
oriented.4 Similarly, Stavros Mavroudeas classifies three alternative explanations to crisis: 
Marxist, radical and mainstream.5 A comprehensive literature review reveals that all these 
approaches make a certain degree of contribution to the analysis of economic crises. The actual 
challenge, however, is to distinguish immediate causes of crisis and systemic underlying causes.6 
The initial assertion of this article is that, as a central claim of Marxism, economic crisis is 
inherent to the capitalist mode of production.7 Within this framework, the article perceives 
economic crises as a structural characteristic of the capitalist mode of production. Other 
approaches based on conjunctural factors and policies implemented may only play a role in 
explaining the triggering effects of crises. However, it is also important to highlight that there are 
a number of systemic explanations to economic crises in capitalism such as the tendency for the 
rate of profit to fall, profit squeeze, overproduction, underconsumption, disproportionality, 
overaccumulation and moral depreciation of capital,8 among which the article follows the 
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footsteps of scholars appealing to the theory of the tendency for the rate of profit to fall as an 
underlying explanation.9 
The capitalist production process suffers from the tendency for the rate of profit to fall 
based on the interrelationship between the rate of profit, the rate of exploitation and the organic 
composition of capital. The law of the tendency for the rate of profit to fall assumes a certain 
proportion between constant capital (machinery, etc.) and variable capital (labour), i.e. the 
organic composition of capital. The law states that capital invests more on constant capital but 
cannot suppress the cost of variable capital under a certain minimum level, and hence, the ratio 
between constant capital and variable capital (the organic composition of capital) deteriorates. 
The source of surplus value is variable capital, and any increase in the organic composition of 
capital creates an internal contradiction in the capitalist production process. The increase in the 
rate of organic composition of capital exceeding the increase in the rate of surplus value 
decreases the rate of profit in the long run.10 This fall in the rate of profit is not an absolute but a 
relative one, and labour market reforms as countervailing tendencies are impotent to completely 
reverse the tendency for the rate of profit to fall.11  
However, in defiance of the criticism directed by David Harvey to some proponents of the 
tendency for the rate of profit to fall for overlooking the effects of financialisation (particularly in 
the case of the current economic crisis),12 this article gives precise importance to the financial 
market, financial instruments and financialisation in the analysis of economic crisis. 
Financialisation is enlisted within conjunctural explanations in Subasat’s categorisation and 
within radical explanations in Mavroudeas’s categorisation of alternative explanations to crisis. 
Although the fluctuations in the financial market and the fictitious profit are not perceived as the 
underlying causes of economic crisis, these have played a crucial role in the way the current 
economic crisis first initiated and became effective. Based on this, there is a need to present a 
brief analysis of the financial market, with an insight into its relation to the real economy. 
The financial market is mainly based on financial instruments and financial packages, 
which promise higher returns than the real economy, and hence turns the financial market into an 
area for speculative and risky activity.13 Moreover, the financial market provides a fertile ground 
for unrestrained competition, and allows banks and other financial institutions to pursue 
‘whatever financial activity would bring the highest profits’.14 Finance, in this respect, promotes 
extensive capital accumulation. 
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The penetration and extension of finance is called financialisation. It represents an attack on 
traditional capitalist relations not only among capital holders but also between labour and capital. 
Financialisation is a process by which ‘various forms of capital in exchange (including financial 
and other assets and markets)’ expands in ‘extent and diversity’.15 It increases the mobility and 
velocity of capital, making it not only more profitable but also more fragile.  
The growth in the value of financial wealth modifies ‘the relations between productive 
capital and financial capital’.16 Financialisation promotes new financial products such as hedge 
funds, repo and mortgage credits,17 and turns into a prolific instrument to cope with the 
difficulties of the capitalist accumulation process. It manipulates higher amounts of capital via 
borrowing and lending mechanisms, which include serious risks in terms of repayment. Banks 
and financial institutions aim to protect themselves against no income-no job-no asset (NINJA) 
borrowers, and ‘securitise mortgages with financial tools that [are] traded with customers and 
other banks and institutions’.18 Labour market reforms, on the other hand, contribute to the 
volume of the financial capital that worsening working conditions, downward pressure on wages, 
unemployment and reductions in public expenditure drive people into debt. These precautionary 
mechanisms further spread these risks throughout the financial market.19 This, in turn, increases 
the size and circulation of financial products in the financial market in the form of credit.  
Finance, however, is a sector where surplus value is not produced but only shared.20 For a 
fully functioning and persistently enlarging stable financial market, there is a need for continual 
capital transfer from the real economy. Hence, due to the tight interconnectedness between the 
real economy and the financial market, chronic vulnerability of the productive market to 
economic crisis in general and the tendency of the rate of profit to fall in particular has striking 
consequences for the financial market. Any fall in the rate of profit affects the functioning of the 
financial market that it confines the amount of capital accumulation in the real economy and also 
downsizes the volume of capital transfer to the financial market. On the other side, any increase 
in the volume of capital accumulation in the financial market based on the expansion of financial 
products should have an equivalent in the real economy, i.e. a commensurate level of increase in 
the rate of profit.  
In this respect, financial capital is principally fictitious, but the necessity for it to have an 
equivalent in the real economy stands non-fictitious (real). Financialisation and the functioning of 
the financial market can solely be comprehended by a scrutiny into its relationship to the real 
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accumulation of productive capital.21 Therefore, the economic crisis might be triggered by the 
incidents in the financial market, but the main reason resides in the structural characteristics of 
the real economy.22 This can also be evidenced by the implementation of restructuring 
mechanisms towards the productive market as the major instrument for battling the economic 
crisis.  
Based on the analysis of the relationship between capital accumulation in the real economy 
and the financial market, the following sections will focus on the emergence of the current global 
economic crisis and its reflections in the Eurozone and PIIGS. The main purpose will be re-
emphasising one of the key highlights in Gökay and Whitman’s argument - the current crisis is a 
structural one as it is both real economy and financial economy crisis,23 but from a rather 
different point spotlighting the gap between the volumes of real profit in the productive market 
and of fictitious profit in the financial market.24 An analysis of the economic crisis in the 
Eurozone and PIIGS would offer an opportunity to uncover ‘the depths of the contradictions that 
have been at work in the entire process of capital accumulation’.25 
 
The Emergence of the Current Global Economic Crisis 
Changes in the structure of the real economy and of the financial market had striking 
repercussions on the imbalance between the real profit and the fictitious profit in a dialectical 
way. The financial market enlarged with tools such as credit, mortgage, social insurance funds, 
bonds and stock markets, and these tools brought higher returns of profit in comparison to the 
real economy. This speeded the flight of capital from the low-profit productive market to the 
high-profit financial market. Transfer of the real profit to the financial market further downsized 
the real economy.26 This, in turn, resulted in capital to limit investments on constant capital, and 
helped to temporarily circumvent the tendency for the rate of profit to fall in the real economy. 
Production could not catch up with the levels of profitability in the financial market despite the 
implementation of comprehensive labour market reforms.27 As the immense size of fictitious 
profit did not have an equivalent in real economy, the imbalance between the fictitious profit and 
the real profit further increased.  
Figure 1 demonstrates the ratio of the growth of capital input to the growth of labour input 
in the period of 1995–2011 to shed light on the fluctuations in the organic composition of capital, 
and henceforth, in the rate of profit. According to the Figure, the ratio of the growth of capital 
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input to the growth of labour input (the organic composition of capital) started to increase in 
Germany and Portugal, and remained steady in the US, the United Kingdom (UK), Ireland and 
Spain in 2005. It had a downward trend only in Italy. Based on this data, it would be plausible to 
argue that the organic composition of capital was either in rise or stable, and hence, the rate of 
profit was either in decline or stable before the emergence of the economic crisis. In other words, 
with the exception of Italy, all these economies met the current global economic crisis with 
relatively decreasing/stable levels of rate of profit. The relative drop in the organic composition 
of capital in the post–2009 period could be explained by the structural measures taken in the 
labour market. 
 
Figure 1 Growth of Capital Input/Growth of Labour Input (Organic composition of capital) 
Source: OECD, ‘Growth of Capital Input/Growth of Labour Input (Organic composition of 
capital)’, 2013 <www.oecd.org/industry/oecd-compendium-of-productivity-indicators.htm> 
(accessed 10 October 2016). 
A comparison between the organic composition of capital in year 1995 and in year 2010 
also demonstrates that the rate of profit in the mid–1990s was even higher than the rate of profit 
in the post–2009 period. Notwithstanding, it is crucial to note that this represents not an absolute 
but a relative decrease in real profits in the economy. 
Whereas the rate of real profit decreased, the rate of fictitious profit continued to increase in 
developed capitalist economies. The rate of the financial sector profits to total profits escalated 
from 25 per cent in the 1980s to 40 per cent before the global economic crisis.28 The rise in the 
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volume of financial capital not only exceeded real profits but also expanded the investment 
opportunities at the productive market.29 Financial capital holders aimed to lend more to receive 
higher returns, but productive capital holders did not have a corresponding need for investment.30 
This also created an imbalance in terms of the supply and demand relationship in the financial 
market and the real economy. Overaccumulation of fictitious capital further inflated the financial 
market. 
The fictitious profits accumulated in the financial market could not be fully served to the 
service of the real economy for more investment on constant capital, but they were presented to 
the use of households, whose working and living conditions were worsened by labour market 
reform policies.31 Fictitious profits were sold as commodities in the financial market. The need to 
put the excessive fictitious capital into use resulted in the broadening of lending mechanisms 
from credit-worthy workers qualified for prime mortgages to less credit-worthy workers qualified 
for subprime mortgages.32 Household debt (as a percentage of disposable personal income) 
increased from 59 per cent in 1982 to 77.5 per cent in 1990, 91.1 per cent in 2000 and 128.8 per 
cent in 2007 in the US.33 Trustworthiness of borrowers decreased, and this radically threatened 
the safety of the financial market. 
The increase in housing prices and mortgage rates encouraged borrowers to buy new 
mortgages to pay the old ones, but start of the fall in housing prices threatened the lending regime 
that borrowers turned insolvent.34 Mortgage sector was bankrupted, and this created a domino 
effect in the world financial market. Tighter integration of national financial markets, higher 
velocity of financial capital and inflow/outflow of fictitious profits led to the endemic and 
epidemic crises in national markets consecutively. 
Therefore, the tight interconnectedness between the financial market and the real economy, 
and the imbalance between the real profit and the fictitious profit evidenced that the crisis began 
in the financial system, but was not generated there.35 The financial boom triggered the crisis,36 
but its fundamental reason resided in the tendency for the rate of profit to fall in the real 
economy.37 
Following the first signs of the economic crisis, the capitalist system responded efficiently. 
In the financial market, recovery policies included the rescue of ‘a large number of systemically 
significant global financial institutions’.38 Capitalist states expropriated national banks, 
introduced credit and liquidity measures to the market, presented guarantees to household 
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investments, and announced production incentives and tax exemptions. Besides the measures 
taken in the financial markets, very comprehensive labour market reforms were introduced 
aiming further deregulation and flexibilisation.39 This also demonstrated that the so-called 
financial crisis is not solely financial, but has roots in the crisis-prone nature of the capitalist 
mode of production.  
The current global economic crisis has also posed a severe challenge for the EU, the 
member states and the Eurozone. Following the financial boom in the US, the Eurozone 
economies proved to be under threat, and implemented equally comprehensive recovery policies 
and austerity measures in the real economy and the financial market. The next section analyses 
the uniqueness of the Eurozone and the economies most intensely exposed to the crisis (PIIGS) 
by referring to tight economic integration, competitiveness and trade imbalance in the Eurozone.  
 
The Eurozone Crisis: Structural Deficiencies, Imbalances and Asymmetries 
The emergence of the US-originated economic crisis in the Eurozone has posed a major question. 
The increased global economic interdependence ‘accelerated transmission of economic 
disturbances from the US to other countries of the world’, and the European member states were 
the first ones under influence.40 A ‘collapse in the market of securities’ followed the financial 
shock, and caused ‘lower financial market capitalisation, a decline in financial liquidity, high 
losses of financial institutions’.41 Credit squeeze initiated in the US market influenced the global 
market, and resulted in an absolute fall in GDP in the Eurozone economies.42 To put it plainly, 
the current global economic crisis first emerged in a highly credit-based economy, i.e. the US, 
and then spread to the Eurozone and revealed its structural deficiencies, imbalances and 
asymmetries.  
Vulnerability of the Eurozone economies to the current global economic crisis was vastly 
related with its tight economic integration entrenched by the SEM and the EMU, which ‘acted as 
the cornerstones of the institutionalization of neoliberalism in the EU’.43 The SEM mainly 
involved the removal of physical, technical and fiscal barriers to trade within the EU, reinforced 
market competition, which consecutively boosted the pressure on labour,44 and influenced the 
competitive capacity of the European market in general. On the other hand, the harmonisation of 
national markets and better competition within the European market posed a threat for member 
states with different labour market structures,45 and also fostered the competition among the 
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European and global markets, which necessitated a further decrease in production costs and 
increase in productivity.  
The EMU targeted ‘management of the single EU currency and euro-zone affairs’ in 
general46 and ‘an open market economy with free competition [and] ... price stability … [as] the 
primary aim of monetary policy’ in particular.47 At the initial stage of joining the EMU, the least 
competitive peripheral countries, that are PIIGS, fixed the exchange rate at a higher value48 
whereas Germany ‘joined the EMU enjoying a devaluation of its exchange rate’.49 The 
Maastricht Agreements introduced certain criteria on inflation rate, government finance, 
exchange rate and interest rate, ‘institutionalise[d] a new currency and mandate[d] strict fiscal 
discipline’, and hence, put the national markets under discipline.50 It substituted national 
currencies with a European currency, and worsened the asymmetries between the core and the 
periphery.51 
The EMU turned the European Central Bank (ECB) into the only monetary policy making 
authority. The centralisation of control by the ECB on national markets terminated the role of 
exchange rate devaluation mechanism in ‘adjust[ing] productivity growth to globally competitive 
levels’.52 The Maastricht criteria embodied impulses to ‘channel income and investment 
opportunities to capital’, to ‘cut state spending’, and ‘to privatise public assets’.53 Moreover, the 
ECB has ‘supported financialization in Europe mostly by protecting the interests of financial 
capital’ that ‘restrictions on financial operations have been abolished’ and the European financial 
capital has gained benefits ‘in competition with US and other global banks’.54  
The introduction of the EMU put a threshold on budget deficits and inflation rates, and 
deprived the member states of monetary policy mechanisms for boosting competitiveness. 
Eurozone economies resigned from their own monetary policy ‘as an instrument of 
macroeconomic stabilisation’,55 and became subject to the European monetary policy. In other 
words, the EMU inactivated the strategy of regaining competitiveness through exchange rate 
regulations.56 Adjustment to the increasingly competitive economy of the Eurozone would only 
‘come through a change in the real exchange rate – that is, changes in wages and prices’.57  
The institutionalisation of the ‘neo-liberal economic paradigm’ at the European level 
expedited the implementation of labour market reform policies by strict monetary and fiscal 
policies.58 As tighter integration through single European currency ruled out the possibilities for 
adjusting national economies with exchange rate regulations, labour market reforms remained as 
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the only mechanism for adjusting to higher levels of competitiveness. Under the ‘no national 
currency mechanism to moderate the differences in competitiveness’, the peripheral countries 
were put in a position to ‘impose drastic restructuring of labour’.59  
In that sense, the SEM and the EMU served to secure the flexibility and deregulation of 
labour regimes and to liberalise labour markets by guaranteeing decrease in costs and increase in 
demand, competition, productivity and growth. The European Employment Strategy (EES) and 
the Lisbon Strategy also encouraged greater labour flexibility.60 Common currency policies and 
finance-led regime of accumulation in the Eurozone further increased the significance of labour 
market reforms as the only tools of increasing the rate of profit. Therefore, growth and 
competitiveness further relied on conditions of work and the performance of the labour market,61 
i.e. labour market flexibility,62 which turned out to be the main tool for macroeconomic 
adjustment in member states.63 The ‘finance-led regime of accumulation’ also necessitated ‘an 
agenda of deregulation, liberalisation and labour flexibility’ with stagnation of real wages and 
productivity growth.64  
Labour market reform policies mainly targeted ‘flexibility of wages by adjusting labour 
prices to supply-demand relationship and improving competitiveness of enterprises by reducing 
wages, thus improving macroeconomic effectiveness and increasing production and 
employment’.65 Hence, ‘higher labour productivity, wage restraint and “neoliberal” welfare 
reforms’ played a key role in increasing the level of competitiveness in the EU.66 The EMU 
functioned as ‘the strategy par excellence of capital’.67  
Despite having a similar point of departure - the influence of the SEM and the EMU on 
boosting competitiveness in Europe, discussions reveal two challenging arguments on the effects 
of competitiveness on the core and peripheral countries of Europe. On the one side, Lapavitsas et 
al. argues that peripheral countries have lost competitiveness against core countries in the 
Eurozone.68 The increasing pressure for competitiveness in a “no exchange rate mechanism” 
market restrained peripheral economies with three alternatives during the economic crisis: to 
adopt austerity, to reform the Eurozone, or to exit from the Eurozone.69 On the other side, Milios 
and Sotiropoulos state that exposure of individual capitals to international competition led 
peripheral economies to higher growth and accumulation rates.70 Based on this argument, they 
claim that international competition within the Eurozone was actually to the benefit of capital in 
the periphery.71   
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In this respect, these two perspectives by Lapavitsas et. al., on the one hand, and Milios and 
Sotiropoulos, on the other hand, on levels of competitiveness in core and peripheral countries of 
the Eurozone makes divergent interpretations of how the introduction of the SEM and the EMU 
has influenced the European market in terms of economic (im)balances. Contrary to Lapavitsas 
et. al., Milios and Sotiropoulos reject the core-periphery divide as a simplistic way of explaining 
the emergence of the economic crisis in the Eurozone.72 Despite agreeing Milios and 
Sotiropoulos’s contributions on the crucial role played by mechanisms for the adjustment of 
labour for higher levels of competitiveness under the conditions of international competition, this 
article affirms that the core-periphery divide is a plausible one in the context of a single currency 
market where economies have started a race for higher levels of competitiveness from very 
disparate stops. 
Accordingly, it is argued that the single market policies and the monetary requirements 
within the Eurozone cause important economic imbalances between core and peripheral 
countries. Tight economic integration policies resulted in the ‘intra-euro area current account 
balances of euro area countries’ to diverge significantly.73 There existed economic and trade 
imbalances among the Eurozone countries in terms of competitiveness, productivity and 
efficiency, which resulted in the emergence of two groups within the Union: importers and 
exporters. Strong economies with higher competitiveness (exporters) and weak economies with 
lower competitiveness (importers) marked the trade relations within the Eurozone. As an 
interrelated and structural phenomenon, a balance of payments crisis characterised the fact that 
‘someone’s surplus [was] someone else’s deficit’.74 In the bilateral trade between Germany and 
PIIGS, for example, German exports became PIIGS imports and vice-versa.75  
 
A Comparative Analysis of the Pre- and Post-Crisis Situation in PIIGS: Competitiveness 
and Financialisation 
Tighter integration of the European market for products and services had a strikingly negative 
impact on national labour markets in terms of wages, working conditions and social security 
rights.76 The EMU put extreme pressure for capitalist exploitation and restructuring of labour, 
and set ‘the strategy of exposure to international competition which only through continual 
“adjustment” of labour can continue to exist’.77 This structural set-up in the Eurozone furthered 
the class struggle and institutionalised the relation of exploitation by intensive labour market 
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policies. An analysis of labour productivity, unit labour cost, public debt, current account 
balance, financial account balance and financial transactions in the Euro Area 16/19, Germany 
and PIIGS would unveil the structural deficiencies, imbalances and asymmetries within the 
Eurozone on the way to the economic crisis. 
Labour productivity and unit labour cost indicators allow to reach some conclusions on the 
asymmetries in the levels of competitiveness within the Eurozone. According to the data 
provided by OECD on labour productivity in total economy (measured in accordance with the 
annual growth rate), average labour productivity was 2.2 in Germany, 1.2 in Portugal, 0.6 in 
Italy, 1.5 in Ireland, 3.4 in Greece and 0.5 in Spain in the period of 2000-2007.78 Similarly, 
OECD data on unit labour cost in total economy (measured in accordance with the annual growth 
rate) demonstrates that average unit labour cost was -0.6 in Germany, 2.6 in Portugal, 2.2 in Italy, 
5.0 in Ireland, 2.3 in Greece and 3.1 in Spain for the same period.79 This comparison between 
Germany and PIIGS state that Germany has the second highest rate of labour productivity and the 
lowest rate of unit labour cost that it is one of the most competitive economies. PIIGS economies, 
on the other hand, have lower rates of labour productivity and higher rates of unit labour cost.  
Figure 2 on labour productivity in the Euro Area (EA) 19, Germany and PIIGS indicates 
that labour productivity fluctuated in the late 1990s and the first years of the 2000s. An analysis 
of labour productivity in Germany and PIIGS on an individual basis shows that labour 
productivity was in decline from 2006/2007 to 2008/2009, with the only exception of Spain. That 
is to say, labour productivity decreased in EA–19, Germany, Portugal, Italy, Ireland and Greece 
in the period just before the emergence of the current global economic crisis. The measures taken 
for increasing labour profitability started boosting it from 2009 onwards, but it has kept 
fluctuating. When the year 2012 is taken as an indicator, the percentage change in labour 
productivity over the previous period was -2.5 in Italy, -1.1 in Greece, -0.7 in Germany, -0.4 in 
the EA-19, 0.1 in Portugal, 0.7 in Ireland and 1.5 in Spain. 
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Figure 2 Labour Productivity (percentage change over previous period), 1996–2015 
Source: Eurostat, ‘Labour Productivity (percentage change over previous period), 1996-
2015’, 2016a, 
<http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=nama_10_lp_ulc&lang=en2016a> 
(accessed 30 June 2016). 
Figure 3 shows the quarterly change on the same quarter of the previous year in unit labour 
cost for the period of 1996–2015 in the EA–19, Germany and PIIGS. It had fluctuated in all of 
these economies in the decade before the emergence of the current global economic crisis. 
According to the research conducted by Perez-Cladentey and Vernengo, unit labour cost 
averagely increased by 7 per cent in Germany, France and Austria, and by 24 per cent in PIIGS in 
the period of 2000–2007.80 In the period preceding the emergence of the crisis, from 2006 to mid-
2008, unit labour cost had a sharp increase in the EA–19, Germany and PIIGS. Unit labour costs 
indicated that the peripheral economies lost competitiveness relative to Germany in the 
Eurozone.81 Hence, these economies met the economic crisis with relatively lower levels of 
competitiveness and decreasing rates of profit. 
The pressures of single market and single currency policies in the Eurozone, and also the 
post-crisis labour market policies in the Eurozone forced a convergence in unit labour cost in 
member states. The unit labour cost reached its lowest level in the EA–19, Germany and PIIGS in 
2010. In this respect, the economic crisis was actually instrumentalised to decrease unit labour 
cost for achieving higher levels of competitiveness in the Eurozone.  
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Figure 3 Unit Labour Cost (quarterly change on the same quarter of the previous year) 
Source: OECD, op. cit. 
Within the straitjacket structure of the Eurozone, the working class has been under 
systematic attack of the capitalist class both at the centre and the periphery.82 However, as the 
figures on labour productivity and unit labour cost do also verify, this attack has put different 
levels of pressure on the working class depending on unique domestic politics of Eurozone 
countries. All Eurozone countries have started the race of competitiveness from very different 
points that core countries have had ‘high real wages and strong social policies’ whereas 
peripheral countries have had ‘low real wages and weak welfare states’.83 Middling levels of 
technology in the periphery, with the exception of Ireland, has also been key to the gap between 
the levels of competitiveness in the Eurozone.84 Therefore, the Eurozone system set the ground 
for unfair competition among central and peripheral economies with the same currency but 
different structural characteristics and levels of strength. The establishment of euro ‘contributed 
to the perpetuation of asymmetries in the current account balances and divergences in the unit 
costs of labour’.85 
According to the Global Competitiveness Report 2010-2011, Portugal was the 46th, Italy 
was the 48th, Ireland was the 29th, Greece was the 83rd and Spain was the 42nd among 133 
countries.86 The most powerful economy of the Eurozone, Germany, ranked the 5th. Moreover, in 
the period of 1999-2006, competitiveness of the economy declined by 27 per cent in Italy, 12 per 
cent in Spain and 10 per cent in Greece in comparison to the other Eurozone economies, and this 
pattern also followed in Portugal and Ireland.87  
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In the Eurozone and PIIGS, public debt also increased in the period of 1998-2009. Labour 
market reforms diminished the purchasing power of workers and the least advantaged groups in 
societies, and ‘unstable income earners need[ed] help from credit and financing’.88 Hence, the 
‘demand for financing for consumption developed’,89 and credit became crucial for sustainability 
of consumption in Europe. Throughout the years, the lending boom financed a large expansion of 
consumption that ‘wide availability of credit generated in PIIGS a large debt-financed increase in 
consumption (both public and private) with growing imports and large trade deficits as a 
consequence’.90 
However, with the burst of the financial boom in the US and then the Eurozone, credit 
squeeze created devastating effects on debt-financed economies. The scarcity of capital was 
followed by the economic growth slowdown, which further increased budget deficits and public 
debt. As it is shown in Table 1, public debt increased in EA–16, Portugal, Italy, Ireland and 
Greece, and decreased only in Spain in the period of 1998–2009. From 2007 to 2009, the 
beginning of the current economic crisis, public debt increased by 19 per cent in EA–16, 21 per 
cent in Portugal, 12 per cent in Italy, 160 per cent in Ireland, 20 per cent in Greece and 47 per 
cent in Spain. 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Euro Area (EA-16) 69.2 68.2 68 69.1 69.5 70.1 68.5 66.2 69.8 79.2 
Portugal 50.5 52.9 55.6 56.9 58.3 63.6 63.9 62.7 65.3 76.1 
Italy 109.2 108.8 105.7 104.4 103.8 105.8 106.6 103.6 106.3 116 
Ireland 37.8 35.6 32.2 31 29.7 27.4 24.8 25 44.3 65.5 
Greece 103.4 103.7 101.7 97.4 98.6 100 106.1 105 110.3 126.8 
Spain 59.3 55.5 52.5 48.7 46.2 43 39.6 36.1 39.8 53.2 
 
Table 1 Public debt in the Euro area in the period of 1998-2009 percentage of GDP) 
Source: Eurostat, compiled by Bukowski, op. cit., p. 281. 
Growing public debt led to ‘a higher risk of investment in treasury bonds’, which meant 
‘higher profitability of bonds in the financial market’.91 Greek, Irish and Portuguese government 
bond yields started to increase in 2009, and this was followed by an increase of credit default 
swaps.92 The rise in risk increased the interest rates to encourage investors to purchase bonds, and 
this in turn led to ‘higher government debt and further difficulties in debt repayment’.93 In this 
regard, countries with high share of fixed costs and high public debt (to GDP) became more 
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vulnerable to the crisis.94 Moreover, the greater the debt held abroad, the greater the probability 
of receiving a speculative attack.95 The Eurozone crisis also indicated how ‘all private debt could 
potentially be public debt’.96  
Although labour market reforms had been implemented for almost two decades in PIIGS, 
the levels of flexibility, deregulation, wage compression, productivity and competitiveness did 
not reach at the levels of strong economies in the EU. Hence, the rate of real profit accumulated 
in the real economy could not compensate the levels of fictitious profit accumulated in the 
financial market. Larger capital inflows also increased the balance of payments imbalances in the 
European periphery.97 The following data on current account balance in Germany (as one of the 
strongest economies in the Eurozone) and PIIGS aims to demonstrate this imbalance within the 
Eurozone. It will also show that the economic crisis rooted not only in ‘sovereign debt and bank 
financials’ but also in ‘the real economy with structural problems’.98 
 
Figure 4 Current account (EUR 1000 million) 
Source: Eurostat, ‘Current account (EUR 1000 million)’, 2016b 
<http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/submitViewTableAction.do> (accessed 30 June 2016). 
Figure 4 shows current account balance in Germany and PIIGS for the period of 2004–
2015. The upward trend in current account surplus in Germany had a rupture in the period of 
2007–2008, but then the increase continued at an increasing rate. On the contrary, current account 
deficit had an upward trend in all PIIGS economies until 2008. It had reached very striking levels 
in Spain, which was followed by Italy, Greece, Portugal and Ireland. Current account balance 
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started to recover from 2007 onwards, and Spain could get closer to the levels in Portugal, Italy, 
Ireland and Greece in 2012. All PIIGS economies perpetuated large current account deficits until 
2013. It turned into current account surplus in Portugal, Italy, Ireland and Spain, the only 
exception being Greece, in the same year. However, the gap between the levels of current 
account surplus in Germany and PIIGS broadened after the emergence of the current economic 
crisis.  
In a nutshell, Figure 4 clearly demonstrates that current account balances developed quite 
uneven, and the asymmetries and imbalanced trade were even further consolidated within the 
Eurozone after the emergence of the current economic crisis. All PIIGS economies suffered from 
trade imbalance within the Union that Germany experienced rising current account surplus 
whereas PIIGS perpetuated large current account deficits.99 Asymmetries within the Eurozone 
and diverging levels of productivity and competitiveness brought imbalanced trade among the 
member states. Therefore, current account balances developed quite uneven as a result of the 
unequal rates of surplus value within the Eurozone. 
The deeper financial integration in Europe and the structural characteristics of the Eurozone 
also enhanced the fragility of the peripheral economies. The peripheral countries seemingly 
gained credibility, which increased the capital inflow, and eventually ‘enabled greater 
consumption and investment in the non-tradable sector and the domestically oriented sectors of 
the economy’.100 Under the elimination of the risk of exchange rate differences, the financial 
flows within the Eurozone ‘increased the foreign liabilities of Southern Europe by almost 70 per 
cent between 1999 and 2009’.101 The capital flows caused real interest rates to decline, which 
supported the credit boom in the period of 2003-2007.102 The growth of housing sector and of 
capital inflow extended ‘credit growth, government spending, debt accumulation and current 
account deficits’.103 Excessive lending caused banks to have debts and governments to burden 
large fiscal deficit.104  
Figure 5 shows financial account in PIIGS in the period of 2004–2015. Strikingly, this 
figure is pretty similar to that of current account. The continuous increase in financial account 
surplus in Germany had a downward trend in the period of 2007–2008, but then turned upward 
and started to increase at an increasing rate until 2014. Quite the reverse, all PIIGS economies 
had financial account deficit in the first years of the 2000s, and deficit further increased in the 
period of 2007–2008. Similar to the case of current account deficit, financial account deficit was 
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also the largest in Spain, and this was followed by Italy, Greece, Portugal and Ireland. It turned 
into financial account surplus in all PIIGS economies in 2013. It is also crucial to underline that 
the volume of financial account surplus in PIIGS is incomparable to the volume of financial 
account surplus in Germany that the total of financial account surplus in PIIGS (102,689 million 
Euro) was less than half of the volume of financial account surplus in Germany (232,197 million 
Euro).   
 
Figure 5 Financial account, 2004–2015 (million Euro) 
Source: OECD, ‘Financial account, 2004-2015 (million Euro)’, 2016b 
<http://stats.oecd.org/#> (accessed 30 June 2016). 
An analysis of the financial transactions in Germany and PIIGS highlights the uneven 
development of the financial market and financial account balances. Figure 6 shows the net 
acquisition of financial assets in Germany and PIIGS for the period of 2001–2009. It indicates 
that financial transactions in Germany were larger than PIIGS economies. Among PIIGS, 
financial transactions were very limited in Portugal and Greece, comparatively larger in Italy, and 
very extensive in Ireland and Spain.  
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Figure 6 Financial transactions, 2001–2009 (millions of Euro) 
Source: Eurostat, Eurostat Yearbook 2010, 2010 
<http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_OFFPUB/KS-CD-10-220/EN/KS-CD-10-220-
EN.PDF> (accessed 15 August 2014). 
An overall analysis of PIIGS economies in terms of the size of financial transactions 
demonstrates that the economies mostly influenced by the crisis were not necessarily the ones 
with the highest levels of financialisation in the EU. Nevertheless, these were the economies that 
did not have the equivalent of their financial assets in the real economy. Current account balance 
and financial account balance were already negative before the emergence of the crisis. During 
the crisis, the economic indicators worsened that the objective of deficit reduction made the 
situation inferior.105 The size of the financial market and financialisation was not extensive in 
PIIGS, but profitability, productivity and competitiveness was rather limited. Therefore, the 
emergence of the economic crisis in PIIGS was a result of both the imbalance in the real 
economy and the imbalance in the financial market within the Eurozone.  
Consequently, both current account balance and financial account balance are highly 
related with productivity and competitiveness. The greater part of debt was held inside the 
Eurozone, and the strong economies of the EU has helped PIIGS further reducing the default 
probability in order to ‘protect the financial stability of the Euro area and the balance sheets of 
their banks’.106 Therefore, the whole process of structural adjustment and austerity focused on 
‘further fiscal consolidation, labour market “reforms”, and supply-side measures supposedly to 
promote growth by “large price and cost adjustments” in the weaker economies’.107 Bailout 
packages involved austerity measures and structural labour market reforms, which aimed to 
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increase the deregulation and flexibility of labour markets by the institutionalisation of atypical 
forms of work and to decrease social expenditures by social security and pension reforms. PIIGS 
economies typically demonstrated the importance of the implementation of labour market 
reforms, and hence, increasing the competitiveness of the real economy, during the current global 
economic crisis. 
 
Conclusion 
The current global economic crisis posed a serious challenge to the EU, the Eurozone and the 
member states. Among other Eurozone economies, PIIGS were strikingly influenced by the crisis 
that the bailout packages and the structural reforms intended to rescue the economies from a total 
collapse. However, despite the tendency to define the emergence of the economic crisis in the 
Eurozone and PIIGS as the result of the financial boom, the austerity measures mainly included 
the implementation of labour market reforms, the key purpose of which was to restructure the 
real economy. 
The paper aimed to grasp the fundamental reasons of the economic crisis in PIIGS. It 
analysed the structure of the real economy in comparison with the structure of the financial 
market, also paying particular attention to the tight interconnectedness between the two markets. 
It examined the growth of capital input and of labour input to evidence the tendency for the rate 
of profit to fall, and reviewed the data on labour productivity, unit labour cost, public debt and 
current account balance to outline the different levels of competitiveness within the Eurozone. 
The paper also scrutinised the financial account balance in a comparative perspective. It reached 
at the conclusion that the Eurozone economies had different levels of economic competitiveness 
but the same currency, which led to an economic and trade imbalance among the members. 
Furthermore, the volume of financial account balance strikingly differed in the Eurozone. 
As a result of this analytical enquiry, the paper stated that the fundamental reason of the 
economic crisis in PIIGS was not only (i) the deficiency or malfunction of the financial market 
such as unregulated financialisation or over-financialisation. It was also (ii) the economic and 
trade imbalance among the Eurozone members, (iii) the falling rates of profit in the real 
economy, and hence, (iv) the failure of real profits to compensate financial profits. The paper also 
underlined that the implementation of labour market reforms as remedies to the crisis aim to 
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increase the rate of real profit, to turn these economies into more profitable and competitive ones, 
and to compensate fictitious profit with increasing rates of real profit.   
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